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The Pardee Center at Boston University, which began life only a few years ago with
the new century and the new millennium, already is known for the quality of its
workshop-symposia each semester and i ts visi t ing professor lecture ser ies
each year. These have vindicated the generosity and the imaginative vision of
Freder ick  S. Pardee, who founded this Center in 2000–2001 to explore the
cha l lenges that lie ahead for the human race in the longer-range future.
Every now and again in the course of our activities, we come across an issue or an
author or an essay to which we would like to draw attention. To do so we have inau-
gurated this pamphlet series of occasional papers.
“Thoughts About Development: Which Are Mere Fads? Which Are Here to Stay?”
represents an important contribution to the study of human development. It comes
from the pen of Paul Streeten, a leader in the field. It is the third pamphlet in our
“Which Way?” series. In recognition of its importance, the United Nations Human
Development office is assisting in its distribution to a network of people around
the world act ively engaged in human development analysis and research. It is
bound to stimulate discussion by students of the field.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
by David Fromkin
2Dr. Stre e t en is the founder and chairman of the
board of World Development, a consultant to the
United Nations Development Program and to the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). He has worked for several
UN bodies. Among other institutions, he has
played a major role in the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the
Institute of Development Studies in Sussex. He is a principal thinker
behind the Human Development paradigm and has been intensely
involved in the writing of all the United Nations Human Development
Repor ts, either as a par t of the team of authors or as an advisor. Dr.
Streeten has par ticipated in numerous conferences and conventions
worldwide . Many of his earlier lectures have been published in the book
Thinking About Development (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
W H I C H  W A Y ?  S P R I N G  2 0 0 5
3
It used to be sa id that there are three forms of discourse: monologue, dialogue,
and Ba logh. My old tutor, mentor, and fr iend, Thomas Ba logh, who indeed
practiced a unique form of conversation, once wrote a book about fads and fash-
ions in economics. Had he been asked to write on the subject that I have chosen
to attempt to discuss here, he would probably have begun by saying that the models
produced by the fads of development economics are elegant and shapely, but lack
the vital organs. I would not have agreed. I bel ieve that we have made progress.
It is true that sometimes the changes in the fashions of thinking about development
appear l ike a comedy of errors, a lurching from one fad to another, a wild-goose
chase. Economic growth, employment creation, jobs and justice, redistribution with
growth, basic needs, bottom-up development, participatory development, sustain-
able deve lopment , market-fr iendly deve lopment , development as l iberat ion ,
as l ibera l i zat ion , as freedom, human development , deve lopment with good
governance; thus goes the carousel of the slogans. My own view is that there has
been an evolution in our thinking about development, though there have also been
periods of regress. Both internal logic and new evidence have led to the revision
of our views. A brief survey of the progress of our thinking will be helpful.
Our thinking about development and the place of people in it has, as I said, under-
gone an evolution, an uneven progress. Both internal logic and new evidence have
led to the continual revision of our views. Previous and partly discarded approaches
have taught us much that is still valuable, and our current approach will surely be
subject to criticisms and be overtaken and replaced by new insights. 
Thinking about the purpose of our soc ial arrangements goes back at least to
Aristotle. The full development of human be ings as the end of al l our act ivit ies
was a recurring theme in the writ ings of most philosophers from the anc ient
Greeks to David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, and of such political
economists as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, and John Maynard Keynes.
T H O U G H T S  A B O U T  D E V E L O P M E N T :
W H I C H  A R E  M E R E  F A D S ?
W H I C H  A R E  H E R E  T O  S T A Y ?
by Paul Streeten
Deficiencies of Growth
4The discussion was resumed in the 1950s, when economic growth was emphasized
as the key to poverty eradication. Even at this early stage, sensible economists and
development planners were quite clear that economic growth is not an end in itself,
but a performance test of development. In 1955 the Nobel Prize-winning West Indian
economist Arthur Lewis defined the purpose of development as widening “the range
of human choice,” exactly as the Human Development Reports since 1990 have done.
The only difference is that Lewis had faith in the efficacy of economic growth for
promoting this objective. 
Three just i f icat ions were given for the emphasis on growth as the princ ipal
performance test. One justification assumed that through market forces—such as
the rising demand for labor, rising productivity, rising wages, lower prices of the
goods bought by the people—economic growth would spread its benefits widely and
speedily, and that these benefits are best achieved through growth. Even in the
early days some skeptics said that growth is not necessarily so benign. They main-
tained that in certain conditions (such as increasing returns, restrictions to entry,
monopoly power, unequal initial distribution of income and assets), growth gives
to those who already have advantages; it tends to concentrate income and wealth
in the hands of the few.
This is where the second assumption came in. Its premise was that governments
are concerned with the fate of the poor. Therefore progressive taxat ion, social
services, and other government interventions would spread the benefits downwards.
The reduct ion of poverty would not be automat ic (as in the f irst assumption),
but governments would take act ion to correct situat ions in which market forces
by themselves concentrated benefits in the hands of the few.
The third assumption was more hardheaded than the previous two. It sa id that
the fate of the poor should not be a concern at the early stages of development.
It was thought necessary first to build up the capital, infrastructure, and productive
capacity of an economy, so that it can improve the lot of the poor later. For a time—
and it could be quite a long period—the poor would have to tighten their belts and
the rich would receive most of the benefits. But if the rewards of the rich are used
to provide incentives to innovate, to save, and to accumulate capital which could
eventual ly be used to benef i t the poor, the early hungry years would turn out
to have been just i f ied. Classical , neoclassical , and palaeo-Marx ist economists
all agreed on this. Some radical l iberal philosophers such as John Rawls1 would
sanction such a strategy. Inequalities, in their view, are justified if they are a neces-
sary condition for improving the lot of the poor.
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Another powerful influence was the so-called Kuznets curve.2 Named after Nobel
Laureate Simon Kuznets, it relates average income levels to an index of equality
and suggests that the early stages of growth are accompanied by growing inequality.
Only at an income per head of about $1,000 (in 1979 dollars) is further growth
associated with reduced inequal ity. One measure of inequal ity is the share of the
bottom 40 percent of the population in total national income. This association has
been suggested by tracing the course of the same country over time (time series),
and of different countries, with different incomes per head, at the same t ime
(cross section). In the early stages of development, as income per head increases,
inequality tends to grow. This may mean that absolute poverty for some groups also
increases. But eventually the turning point, the bottom of the U-curve, is reached,
after which growing income is accompanied by greater equal ity and, of course,
reduced poverty. The golden age is ushered in.
None of the assumptions underlying these three just if icat ions turned out to be
universally true. Except for a very few countries, with special initial conditions
such as radical land reform and special pol icies such as heavy emphasis on mass
education and health measures, there was no automatic tendency for increasing
incomes to be spread widely. Nor did governments often take correct ive act ion
to reduce poverty. Governments were themselves often formed by people who had
close psychological, social, economic, and pol it ical l inks with beneficiaries of the
process of concentrated growth, even though the ir mot ives were of ten mixed.
And it certainly was not true that a period of enduring mass poverty was needed to
accumulate savings and investment and to raise productivity. It was found that
smal l farmers saved at least as high a proport ion of the ir incomes as big land-
owners; that they were more productive, in terms of yield per acre; that entrepre-
neurial talent was widespread and not confined to large firms; and that some forms
of consumption by the poor were not only desirable in themselves but also made
them more productive. Prolonged mass poverty was therefore not needed to accu-
mulate capital and to stimulate entrepreneurship. 
To judge by the growth of the gross nat ional product (GNP), the development
process since World War II has been a spectacular, unprecedented, and unexpected
success. But at the same t ime we witnessed increasing diversi ty of growth
between different developing countries, and increasing dual ism within many
of them. Despite high rates of growth of industrial product ion and continued
6general economic growth, not enough employment was created for the rapidly
growing labor force. Nor were the benefits of growth always widely spread, and the
lower income groups often did not benefit.
In a much-quoted, classical article Arthur Lewis had predicted that poor and low-
productivity subsistence farmers and landless laborers would move from the coun-
tryside to the high-income, urban, modern industries.3 This move would increase
inequality in the early stages (so long as rural inequalities were not substantially
greater than urban inequalities), but when more than the critical number of rural
poor had been absorbed in modern industry, the golden age would be ushered in,
when growth would be married to greater equality. In this way an explanation for
the statistical association of the Kuznets curve was provided.
It became evident , however, that the Lewis model, which strongly dominated
not only academic thought but also political action, did not always work in reality.
It did not apply for four reasons. First, the rural-urban differentials were much
higher than had been assumed, owing to trade union act ion on urban wages,
minimum wage legislation, differentials inherited from colonial days, and other
causes. This produced an excess of migrants to the towns. Second, the rate of
growth of the population and with it that of the labor force was much larger than
expected: between 2 and 3 percent per year. Third, the technology transferred from
the industrial countries to the urban industrial sector of the developing countries
was labor-saving, and although it raised labor productivity it did not create many
jobs. Fourth, in many developing countries a product ivity-ra ising revolut ion
in agriculture was a precondition for substantial and widespread progress in indus-
try, and this revolution had not occurred.
Jobs and Justice
It was not surprising, then, that attention turned away from GNP and its growth.
Some even wanted to “dethrone GNP” in the 1960s, not for the currently fashion-
able reason of environmental protect ion, but because i t neglected employment
and income distribution, jobs, and justice. Since 1969 the International Labor
Organization had attempted under the World Employment Programme to promote
jobs in the developing countries. It had organized employment missions to several
countries—Colombia , Kenya , The Phi l ippines, Iran , Sri  Lanka , the Dominican
Republic, the Sudan, and Egypt—to explore ways of creating more productive and
remunerative employment. While this was an extremely useful learning exercise,
W H I C H  W A Y ?  S P R I N G  2 0 0 5
7
i t soon became evident that unemployment was not real ly the ma in problem.
“Employment” and “unemployment” make sense only in an industrial ized society
where there are employment exchanges, organized and informed labor markets,
and social security benefits for the unemployed who are trained workers, willing
and able to work , but temporari ly without a job. Much of this does not apply
to the poorest developing countries, in which livelihoods are more important than
wage employment.
Another Nobel Laureate, Gunnar Myrdal, tried to replace the concept of “employ-
ment” by the concept of “labor utilization.” It has numerous dimensions when
applied to self-employed subsistence farmers, landless laborers, artisans, traders,
educated young people, saffron-clad monks, beggars, caste-conscious Brahmans,
or women, in soc iet ies without organized labor markets. “Employment” as
interpreted in industrial countries was found not to be the appropriate concept.
To afford to be unemployed, a worker has to be fa irly wel l off. To survive, an
unemployed person must have an income from another source. The root problem,
it was found, is frequently poverty, or low-productivity employment, not unem-
ployment. Many of the moderately poor are not unemployed but work very hard and
long hours in unremunerat ive, unproduct ive forms of act ivity. True, among
the poorest of the poor, unemployment can be a common form of suffering, but even
then its roots are quite different from those of unemployment in industrial countries. 
The discovery that the problem is often unremunerative work of low productivity
drew attention to the informal sector: the street traders, garbage col lectors,
and casual workers, as well as many in small-scale production such as blacksmiths,
carpenters, sandal makers, builders, and lamp makers. These people often work
extremely hard and long hours, are self-employed or employed by their family, and
are sometimes very poor. Attention was also directed to the women who, in some
cultures, perform hard tasks without being counted as members of the labor force
because their production is not sold for cash. The problem was the redefinition of
the “working poor.”
Labor uti l izat ion covers more dimensions than the demand for labor (the lack
of which gives rise to Keynesian unemployment) and the need for cooperat ing
factors of production such as machinery and raw materials (the lack of which gives
rise to Marxian “non-employment”). There is a good deal of evidence that not
only labor but also capital is grossly underutilized in many developing countries.
8This suggests other causes for underutilization than surplus labor in relation to
scarce capital. More specifically, the causes of low labor utilization can be classi-
fied under four headings: consumption and levels of l iving (including education
and health), attitudes, institutions, and policies.
Nutrition, health, and education are elements of the level of living that are impor-
tant for fuller labor utilization. They have been neglected because in advanced
societies they count as consumption and this has no effect on human productivity.
The only exceptions that have been admitted in the l iterature until recently are
some forms of education. In poor countries, however, better nutrition, health, edu-
cation, and training can be very productive forms of investment in human capital.
This is one thread that goes into the fabric of human development.
The second dimension, attitudes, makes a difference in the kinds of jobs people
will accept. In Sri Lanka, for example, a large part of unemployment is the result of
the high aspirations of the educated, who are no longer prepared to accept “dirty”
manual jobs. Caste attitudes in India also present obstacles to fuller labor utiliza-
tion. In Africa those with primary education wish to leave the land and become
clerks in government off ices. In many soc iet ies manual work or rural work  is
held in contempt.
The third dimension is the absence or weakness of such inst i tut ions as labor
exchanges, credit faci l it ies, market ing organizat ions, centers of informat ion,
and a system of land ownership or tenancy that provides incentives and abil ity
to till the soil. As a result, labor is underutilized.
Finally, the wrong policies for fuller labor utilization are often adopted: labor in the
organized sector is over-priced, capital is under-priced, food bought from the small
growers is under-priced, the exchange rate is over-valued, making labor-intensive
exports difficult, etc. 
For reasons such as these, the concepts of unemployment and underemployment as
understood in the North were found to be not applicable, and an approach to poverty
that assumes levels of living, skills, attitudes, and institutions fully adapted to full
labor utilization has turned out to be largely a dead end. Unemployment can coexist
with considerable labor shortages and capital underutilization.
W H I C H  W A Y ?  S P R I N G  2 0 0 5
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Inappropriate att i tudes and inst i tut ions can also frustrate some approaches
to meeting basic needs. Focusing on the needs of men, women, and children draws
attention to the appropriate inst itut ions (such as land reform, public services,
and credit facilities) to which households need access, and to the attitudes (such as
those toward women’s welfare) that need changing to secure better distribution
within the household. 
The employment concept was quest ioned for other reasons too. The creat ion
of more employment opportunities, far from reducing unemployment, increases it.
Those who come from the countryside to the towns in search of jobs balance the
expectation of high earnings against the probability of getting a job.4 As job oppor-
tunities increase, they attract more people. The influx of migrants in turn contrib-
utes to the high rate of urban drift and the growth of shantytowns. The employed
urban workers, though poor by Western standards, are among the better-off when
measured against the distribution of income in their own countries.
These difficulties turned the development debate to the question of income distri-
bution. One of the landmarks was the book published in 1974 for the Development
Research Center of the World Bank and the Inst itute of Development Studies
of the University of Sussex entitled Redistribution with Growth.5 Among many
questions about relations between growth and redistribution were the following:
do conventional measures of growth involve a bias against the poor, and how can
this be changed? How can strategies of redistribution be combined with strategies
of growth? Is it possible to identify groups whose members have common charac-
terist ics and to direct strategies toward those groups? What are the principal
instruments of pol icy? But apart from these questions, it raised two sets of ques-
tions, of special interest in the present context:
(1) What can be done to increase the product ivity of the smal l-scale, labor-
intensive, informal sector “discovered” by the ILO employment mission to
Kenya? How can we remove discrimination against this sector and improve i ts
access to information, credit, and markets? The question is how does redistri-
bution affect efficiency and growth? Does helping the “working poor” mean
sacrificing productivity; is it an efficient way of promoting growth?
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(2) To turn the question the other way around, how does economic growth affect
distribution? It was quite clearly seen that in low-income countries economic
growth is a necessary condition for eradicating poverty, but it also seems
that economic growth somet imes re inforced and entrenched inequal i t ies
in the distribution of incomes, assets, and power. Not surprisingly, when
growth began with an unequal distribution of assets and power, it was more
difficult to redistribute incomes and to eradicate poverty. And the results of
redistributing incremental income turned out to be pitifully small. According
to one simulat ion exerc ise, an annual transfer of 2 percent of GNP over
25 years into public investment to build up the stock of capital ava i lable
to the poor—thought to be a very “dynamic” pol icy—would, after 40 years,
ra ise the consumption of the poorest 40 percent of the populat ion by only
23 percent; that is to say, their rate of consumption growth would accelerate
by 0.5 percent a year: $1 for a $200 income. The model excludes, however, the
human capital aspect of some forms of consumption and the impact on
labor utilization, which are stressed by the basic needs approach.
In spite of its title, most of Redistribution with Growth is concerned not with rela-
tive income shares but with the level and growth of income in low-income groups.
Much of the redistribution l iterature measures inequal ity by the Gini coefficient,
which runs through the whole range of incomes, from the richest to the poorest.
It measures somewhat meaningless percenti les instead of soc ial ly, regional ly,
or ethnically significant deprived groups. It does not tell who is in these deci le
groups, for how long, or for what reasons. Nor does it indicate the scope for mobility
or the degree of equality of opportunity. Normally there is no particular interest
by those concerned with poverty reduction in redistribution to the middle, which
would reduce inequality but leave poverty untouched. Nor is the fate of income
dec i les as such of much interest , for these are not soc iological ly, pol i t ical ly,
or humanly interesting groups.
An empirical question is how economic growth affects the reduction of inequality
and poverty, and how this reduction in turn affects efficiency and economic growth.
The answers to these questions will depend on the initial distribution of assets, the
policies pursued by the government, the available technologies, the scope for labor-
intensive exports, which enlarges the application of labor-intensive technologies,
and the rate of population growth. Land reform and access to basic mass education
W H I C H  W A Y ?  S P R I N G  2 0 0 5
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are preconditions for equitable growth, but they are not enough. Continuing policies
and vigilance are needed to prevent large inequalities from reestablishing them-
selves, even if they are eliminated initially. Another important empirical question
is how pol icies to reduce inequal it ies and meet basic needs affect freedom and
human rights.
It is true that we do not have a production function for meeting adequate standards
of nutrition, health, education, and family planning. It is not known precisely
which financial, fiscal, and human resources policies produce these desirable results.
The causes are multiple and interact in a complex and still partly unknown manner.
But at least it is fairly clear when the objective has been attained, and the criteria
by which it is judged are also clear.
Basic Needs
After the disappointment with growth, af ter the dead end of “employment”
as interpreted in industrial countries, and after the l imitation and irrelevance of
egalitarianism and redistribution, basic human needs were the next logical step
in development think ing. The basic needs approach emphasi zed that income
increases are not enough to reduce poverty. Mass education, safe water, family
planning, health services, and other services depend on public action. Some poor
people are incapable of earning income. The basic needs approach has also always
called for participatory community involvement and self-governing institutions in
the design and implementation of projects and programs. The best shorthand way
of describing the basic needs approach is: incomes + public services + participation. 
The basic needs approach has at least four advantages over previous approaches
to growth, employment, income redistribution, and poverty eradication. First, the
basic needs concept is a reminder that the objective of development is to provide
all human beings with the opportunity for a full life. However a “full life” is inter-
preted, the opportunity for achieving it presupposes meeting basic needs. In the
previous decades those concerned with development have sometimes lost their
way in the technical intricacies of means—growth rates, production, productivity,
savings ratios, export ratios, capital-output ratios, tax ratios, and so on—and lost
sight of the end. They also emphasized the economic component of development
at the expense of nonmaterial ones that contribute to human development .
They came near to being guilty, to borrow a term from Karl Marx, of “commodity
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fetishism.” Being clear about the end obviously must not imply neglecting the
means: on the contrary, it means efforts are directed at choosing the right means
for the ultimate ends that are desired. In the past, planners have moved away from
one aim of development, which is meeting basic needs, to some conglomeration of
commodities and services valued at market prices, irrespective of whether they are
air conditioners or bicycles, luxury houses or rural shelters, whether they benefit
the rich or the poor, and irrespect ive of noneconomic costs and benef i ts such
as human rights, freedom, and participation. The basic needs approach recalled
the fundamental concern of development, which is human beings and their needs.
Second, the approach went beyond abstractions such as money, income, or employ-
ment. These aggregates have their place and function; they are important concepts
and, though in need of revision, should not be abandoned; but they are useless
i f they concea l the spec i f ic, concrete object ives that people themse lves seek .
To consider basic needs is to move from the abstract to the concrete, from the
aggregate to the specific, from commodities to people.
The evolution sketched above shows that the concepts have become decreasingly
abstract and increasingly disaggregated, concrete, and, above a l l , centered
on people. Start ing with GNP and i ts growth, a highly abstract and unspecif ied
conglomerate of goods and services, irrespective of what, how, for whom, and for
what, development thinking then turned to employment, a somewhat more specific
goal. The discussion was then narrowed down to particular groups of unemployed:
school leavers, recent migrants to the city, landless laborers, small-scale farmers
without secure water supply, and so forth. But “employment” also was seen to have
serious limitations. Ideas were next further narrowed to identify deprived groups
of individuals and families—women, children under five, the elderly, youth with
specif ic needs, ethnic groups discriminated against, communities in distant and
neglected regions. Economic growth is no longer the ult imate object ive of
economic development, but an incidental result of aiming at the right composition,
distribution, and use of product ion, and a sat isfying way of accomplishing i t ,
for the present and future generations.
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Third, the basic needs approach appealed to members of national and international
aid-giving institutions and was therefore capable of mobilizing resources, unlike
more vague (though important) objectives, such as raising growth rates to 6 percent,
contributing 0.7 percent of GNP to development assistance, redistributing for
greater equal ity, or narrowing income gaps. People do not normally share lottery
prizes or other gains in wealth with their adult brothers and sisters, but they do
help when their siblings are ill, or their children need education, or some other basic
need has to be met . The same is true in the wider human family. Meet ing
basic needs has some of the characteristics of a public good. One person’s satisfac-
tion from knowing that a hungry child is fed does not detract from other people’s
satisfaction. The basic needs approach therefore has the power to mobilize support
for policies that more abstract notions lack. 
Fourth, the basic needs approach has great organizing and integrating power intel-
lectually, as well as pol it ically. It provides a key to the solution of problems that
are at first sight separate, but, on inspection, prove to be related. If basic needs are
made the starting point, these otherwise recalcitrant problems fall into place and
become solvable.6
In one sense, this was a homecoming. For when the world embarked on develop-
ment more than half a century ago, it was primarily with the needs of the poor in
mind. Third World leaders wanted economic as wel l as pol it ical independence,
but independence was to be used for people’s self-fulf i l lment . The process got
sidetracked, but many important discoveries about development were made:
the importance of mak ing sma l l-sca le farmers and members of the informa l
urban sector more product ive and ra ising the ir earning power; the scope for
“efficient” redistribution, that is, redistribution that contributes to more equitable
economic growth; the numerous dimensions of labor markets; and the importance
of creating demand for certain types of products and the labor producing them. 
A common minimum formulation of the objectives of development is sustainable
growth (of consumption) with equity, or, better, with rapid poverty reduct ion.
Equity means that there should not be unfair or unjustified discrimination. Some
poverty reduction may have to be unequal, in the sense that not all the poor can
become better off at the same t ime, so that some groups, or some regions, may
have to be favored, at least for a time. This is particularly important if the selective
pol icy favoring one group eventually helps to eradicate more speedily the poverty
of those left behind.
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We should dist inguish between inequal i ty and inequity. If A, whose si tuat ion
is in al l relevant respects the same as B’s, has more than B, that is inequal i ty;
i f he or she has more because B has less, or if B has less because A has more, that
is inequitable or iniquitous. But even where exploitative and iniquitous inequality
is absent, we should still be concerned with the fate of the poor. Both poverty and
some forms of inequal ity are evils, but poverty is the greater evil. And inequal ity
can also be a source of hope when those lef t behind rightly think  that they
can catch up with those ahead and grasp the opportunit ies to advance by the ir
own efforts.7
Equality can refer to many things: income, resources, utility, achievements, primary
goods, opportunities, freedom, human rights, the right to vote, etc. Equality in one
dimension means inequal ity in another. Even those most wedded to free markets
who think that more productive work deserves higher rewards believe in equality
of opportunity; those who bel ieve in markets bel ieve in equal i ty of freedom to
choose. The basic aim is to find a practical conception of equal ity that can give
people a sense that they receive equal considerat ion from society and so have a
stake in it. The kind of equality denounced by Anatole France when he wrote “the law
in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread” is not enough. Equal i ty of freedom to
choose is generally acknowledged as desirable. 
Raising production and productivity of the poor, although important, is not enough.
Many productivity gains in the Third World have been passed on to foreign buyers
(e.g., in lower prices of export crops) or to large multinational corporations, or to
the better-off groups at home. The gains must also be remunerative for the poor, as
well as productive.
But basic needs comprise more than economic benefits. We may also wish to add
the objective of security and stability: economic, political, and legal. Greatly fluc-
tuating gains and insecure jobs are discounted, even if their average is larger than
a more stable, though lower, level . So, as a f irst approximat ion, the object ive
became product ive, remunerat ive, susta inable, stable, and equitable growth of
consumption (or, to remove the ambiguities in “equity,” growth with rapid reduc-
tion of absolute poverty).
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But this does not exhaust the range of object ives. Some of the most important
contribut ions to poverty reduct ion , ref lected in what poor people actua l ly
want , do not show up in growth figures, and are not achieved by economic growth.
Poverty is multi-dimensional and cannot be subsumed under one or two or a few
indicators of deprivation. 
As the basic needs concept entered the North-South dialogue, all sorts of miscon-
ceptions and misinterpretat ions grew around i t .8 First , i t was sa id that basic
needs are confined to basic commodity bundles and that the choices are limited:
educat iona l services, hea l th services, food, she l ter, and that i t amounts to a
prescription of “count, cost, and del iver”: count the poor, cost the bundle, and
deliver it to the “target groups” (people who are not only got at, but, metaphorically,
shot at, instead of being regarded as active agents). Second, it was thought that
the role allotted to the state was too powerful, both in determining what basic needs
are and in providing for their being met, and that this type of paternalism is both
ineff icient and unworthy. Third, i t was held that there was a neglect of opening
up opportunities to people: access to jobs, income, assets, credit, and power were
neglected in favor of so many calories, so many yards of cloth.
Opposition in developing countries also grew, particularly to the use of the concept
by donor countries. Some of the objections raised by the developing countries were
just if ied, such as the use of the concept as an excuse to reduce development a id
and to put up protectionist barriers, or its use to divert attention from the need to
reform the system of international relations; others reflected the vested interests
of the rich in the poor countries who resist attempts to reduce their power and
wealth. Similarly, the rich countries raised both legitimate and illegitimate objec-
tions. The result was that the concept faded away in international conversations,
although it still has adherents among many of the drafters of plans in the developing
countries, among private voluntary organizat ions and act ivists, and among
thinkers and those with common sense.
Retreats and Advances
The 1980s were a period of crisis, of setbacks and retreats. The debt problem, and
adjustment and stabilization pol icies were the principal concerns. Stabilization
was sought through deflationary policies that reduced output and employment.
The poor were either forgotten or, instead of seeking ways to reduce their number,
ways were sought to prevent an increase.
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Many criticisms were voiced against the prescriptions of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Among them was the charge that IMF recommendations attempt to
solve structural problems, such as an oil price increase in oil-importing countries,
or a permanent deteriorat ion in the terms of trade from some other reason,
by monetary restrictions, thereby inflicting unnecessary unemployment, underuti-
l ization of capacity and forgone production, as well as being counterproductive
by depriving firms of the means to invest in the exploration of new deposits and in
related industries, in oil substitutes, and in conservation.
Another criticism is that the IMF concentrates on reducing demand instead of
increasing supplies, on cutt ing imports rather than expanding exports. During
the 1980s many countries, instead of raising exports and reducing imports, found
that both exports and imports were reduced. It is almost always possible to achieve
stabilizat ion and correct ion of the balance of payments by pol icies that reduce
income, demand, and employment sufficiently, without reallocating resources to
investment and exports, in other words without fundamental adjustment. The criti-
cism is that the IMF has advocated this kind of “stabilization without adjustment.”
At the same time, this period witnessed a worldwide surge to freedom, democratic
government, and demand for participation. During the 1980s, and while stabili-
zation and adjustment policies were pursued, new concerns were incorporated in
the development dialogue: the role of women (and children), the physical environ-
ment, populat ion, habitat ion, human rights, pol it ical freedom and governance,
empowerment, corruption, the waste of military expenditure and the “peace divi-
dend,” and the role of culture among them. The basic needs approach was regarded
as too narrowly focused on commodity bundles delivered to people by the govern-
ment, and it had to carry the ballast of past misinterpretations.
At this t ime in the 1980s several authors proposed a variety of “new growth
theories.” These have a bearing on the relat ion between human development
and economic growth. The observation that output has grown faster than popula-
t ion for over 200 years, while different countries have rema ined on different
growth paths, was an important motivation for the construction of these new mod-
els. In the older growth theories, growth is seen as the result of the accumulation
of productive factors and of exogenous technological progress that makes factors
more product ive. In the new growth theories, the emphasis is switched to the
way the changes in total factor product ivity can be related to several external
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economies (benefits from investment to others than those who incur the costs) that
are present in most economies and to the acquisition of knowledge, education, and
on-the-job training. In this framework the long-term growth rate is not determined
by the exogenous rate of technical progress, but by the behavior of people respon-
sible for the accumulation of productive factors and knowledge.
There are two implications of this switch: first, growth is not explained by techno-
logical progress that comes from outside the economic system but by the “endoge-
nous” behavior of people. Second, education and knowledge, particularly in the
form of Research and Development (R&D), incorporated in human or physical capi-
tal or in books and blueprints, play an important part in increasing total produc-
tivity and thus in enhancing growth.
The impact of higher levels of education is twofold. First, a better-educated and
tra ined workforce ra ises the product ivity of the cooperat ing factors because
better-educated people are more l i ke ly to innovate and to be more eff ic ient
in general. Second, better education benefits others who can now earn more, in
addition to the educated person.
R&D similarly improves not only the productivity and profitability of the firm that
invests in it, but also those of other firms or individuals that buy its products.
Moreover, some discoveries are freely accessible to all firms that can benefit from
them. In these ways investing in human capital can overcome the diminishing
returns of invest ing in physical capital. It fol lows from the external benef its of
education, R&D, and knowledge generally that private agents will tend to under-
invest in them and that public interventions such as subsidies are necessary to
ensure adequate investment.
A problem with any model that emphasizes a single factor, such as education or R&D,
as the driving force of development is that it is easy to point to counter-examples.
Although it is true that, looking at many countries, a correlation between economic
growth and education can be found, there are also important exceptions. Sri Lanka
had high levels of widespread education without spectacular growth, while Brazil
enjoyed high growth rates with low levels of education. Real ity is more compli-
cated than single-factor models suggest. 
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Human Development and Capabilities
The 1980s were also the time when Amartya Sen set out to propose an alternative
approach to utility and “welfarism,” expanding and deepening the basic needs
approach. People value commodities, he argues, not in their own right but for their
characteristics and for the needs they meet. But going beyond this, he noted that
the results of consuming commodities depend also on the characteristics of the
consumer (whether he or she is able-bodied or disabled) in the society of which he
or she is a member. Sen also emphasized that freedom to choose is important to
wel l-being. The wel l-being of a fast ing monk is different from that of a starving
pauper. The standard of l iving should be judged by a person’s “capabil i ty” to
lead the l i fe that he or she va lues, from be ing we l l fed and hea l thy to achiev-
ing se l f-respect and participating in the life of the community.
The t ime had come for a wider approach to improving the human condition that
would cover all aspects of human development, for all people, in both high-income
and developing countries, both now and in the future. It went far beyond narrowly
defined economic development to cover the full flourishing of all human capabili-
ties. It emphasized again the need to put people, their needs, their aspirations, and
their choices at the center of the development effort and to assert the unaccepta-
bility of any biases or discrimination, whether by class, gender, race, national ity,
religion, community, or generation. Human Development had arrived.
The f irst Human Development Report of the United Nat ions Development
Programme, published in 1990 under the inspirat ion and leadership of its archi-
tect, Mahbub ul Haq, came after a period of crisis and retrenchment, in which con-
cern for people had given way to concerns for balancing budgets and payments.
It met a felt need and was widely welcomed. Human development was there defined
as a process of enlarging people’s choices, not just between different detergents or
television channels or car models, but of jobs, educat ion, and le isure pursuits.
These choices can change over time and can, in principle, be infinite. Yet, infinite
choices without limits and constraints can become pointless and mindless. Choices
have to be combined with allegiances, rights with duties, options with bonds, liber-
ties with ligatures. It is true that bonds without options are oppressive; but options
without bonds are anarchic. Indeed, choices without bonds can be as oppressive as
bonds without choices. 
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Just as at the end of the 19th century the reaction against extreme Manchester lib-
eralism took the form of “collectivism,” not nowadays a popular concept, so today
we see a reaction against the extreme individualism of the free market approach
towards what has come to be called communitarianism. The exact combination of
individual and public action, of human agency and social institutions, will vary
from time to time and from problem area to problem area. Institutional arrange-
ments wil l be more important for achieving environmenta l susta inabi l i ty,
personal agency more important when it comes to the choice of household articles
or marriage partners. But some complementarity will always be necessary.
Among the most important choices is the abi l i ty of people to lead a long and
healthy l ife, to acquire knowledge, and to have access to the resources needed
for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are available, many other
opportunities are opened. These three basic choices are reflected in the Human
Development Index. But many additional choices are valued by people. These range
from pol it ical, social, economic, and cultural freedom to opportunities for being
productive and creative, and enjoying self-respect and human rights.
Human development has two sides: (1) the formation of human capabilities, such as
improved health, knowledge, and skills; and (2) the use people are willing, able, and
permitted to make of these capabilities: for leisure, productive purposes, or partici-
pation in cultural, social, and pol it ical activities. The rapid expansion of these
capabil it ies—including those associated with educat ion, health, social security,
credit, gender equality, land rights, and local democracy—depends crucially on pub-
lic action that is neglected by many developing countries. On the other hand, by
removing itself from excessive regulation and bureaucratic interventions in produc-
tion and trade, the government can also contribute to expanding social opportunities. 
The use of these capabilities can be frustrated if the opportunities for their exercise
do not exist or if they are deprived of these opportunities as a result of discrimina-
tion, obstacles, or inhibitions: if there is no demand for their productive contribu-
tions so that people are unemployed, or if they do not have enough leisure, or if
political oppression or deprivation of human rights prevents them from full partic-
ipation in the life of their communities. There can be “jobless” growth, there can
be “voiceless” growth, there can be “rootless” growth, and there can be jobless, voice-
less, and rootless non-growth. Different countries illustrate each of these cases.
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Getting income is one of the options people would like to exercise. It is an important,
but not an all-important option. Human development includes the expansion of
income and wealth, but it includes many other valued and valuable things as well.
For example, in investigating the priorities of poor people, one discovers that what
matters most to them often differs from what outsiders assume. More income is
only one of the things desired by poor people. Adequate nutrition, safe water at hand,
better medical services, more and better schooling for their children, cheap trans-
port, adequate shelter, continuing employment and secure livelihoods, and produc-
tive, remunerative, satisfying jobs do not show up in higher income per head, at
least not for some time.
There are other non-material benefits that are often more highly valued by poor
people than material improvements. Some of these partake in the characteristics
of rights, both positive and negative, others in those of states of mind. Among
these are good and safe working conditions, freedom to choose jobs and livelihoods,
freedom of movement and speech, self-determination and self-respect, independence,
mobility, liberation from oppression, violence, and exploitation, less dependence
on patrons, security from persecution and arbitrary arrest , not having to move
in search of work, a satisfying family life, the assertion of cultural and religious
values, a sense of identity, access to power or direct empowerment, recognition,
status, adequate leisure time and satisfying forms of its use, a sense of purpose
in life and work, the opportunity to join and participate actively in the activities of
civil society, and a sense of belonging to a community. These are often more highly
va lued than income, both in the i r own r ight and as a means to sat isfying and
productive work. They do not show up in higher income figures. No policymaker
can guarantee the achievement of all, or even the majority, of these aspirations,
but pol icies can create the opportunities for their fulfillment.
Economic growth can be quite rapid without an improvement in the quality of life
of the majority of the people, and many countries have achieved a high quality of
life with only moderate growth rates of income. It has been observed that there is a
positive correlation between income per head and the indicators of human develop-
ment. Some have drawn the erroneous conclusion that it is only income that mat-
ters. But, first, this relationship is far from perfect, and interesting questions are
raised by the outliers and particularly by countries that have achieved high human
development at low levels of income; and, second, this relation depends entirely on
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the extra income that arises from growth being used for public education and
health and for specif ic attacks on poverty. If these two conditions are absent, the
correlation disappears.9 Much depends also on the initial distribution of assets.
If land ownership is fairly equally distributed and mass education is widespread,
the benefits of economic growth will be reflected in good human development.
Economic growth is often considered to be an essential component of human devel-
opment. But growth (in the narrow sense of a continuing increase of the quantity
of goods and services produced and consumed over time) is simply the intertempo-
ral dimension of any policy objective, although it has been wrongly monopolized by
production and consumption: it should apply to poverty reduction, employment,
investment , a more equitable income distr ibut ion, environmental protect ion,
leisure, and, of course, also to income. But once you specify for income, consump-
t ion, product ion—the what? to whom? by whom? for what? and when?—growth
becomes the incidental result, not the objective, of a sensible economic pol icy.
Growth is too unspecif ied, abstract , aggregate, and unbounded to be a sensible
objective of policy. It also implies an infinite horizon, without limits to increases
in income. What matters is the composition of the national income, to what uses it
is put, its distribution among beneficiaries, now and for future generations; and
with how much effort and in what condit ions i t is produced. If, and only if, the
extra resources resulting from growth go largely to the poor, and they are spent
on public health and education, will a contribution to human development result. 
The nat ional income is a quite inadequate measure of human development for
several reasons. It counts only goods and services that are exchanged for money,
leaving out of account the large amount of work done inside the family, mainly by
women, and work done voluntarily for children or older people or in communities.
Public services are counted at their cost, so that doubling the wages of all public
servants appears to double their contribution to welfare or development. National
income accounting does not distinguish between goods and regrettable necessities,
like military or anticrime expenditure, products needed to combat “bads.” Addictive
eating and drinking is counted twice: when the food and the alcohol are consumed,
and when large sums are spent on the diet industry and on cures for alcoholism.
Much of what is now counted as economic growth is really either combating evils,
and fixing blunders and social decay from the past, or borrowing resources from the
future, or shifting functions from the community and household to the market.10
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National income accounting does not add leisure gained by fewer working hours or
an earlier retirement age, and it does not subtract from the extra income generated
and leisure lost if women are forced (or desire) to take on jobs outside the family,
or men to take on a second job. Environmental degradation, pollution, and resource
depletion are not deducted, so that the earth is treated, it has been said, like a busi-
ness in liquidation. Freedom, human rights, and participation are ignored. It would
be perfectly possible to attain high incomes per head and the satisfaction of all
material needs in a well-managed prison. Most important, the conventional measure
does not allow for the distribution of income, counting all goods and services at
the ir market prices. Increasing the product ion of whiskey, bought by rich men,
counts for much more than increasing the production of milk that would have gone
to a starving child. Attempts have been made here and there to correct for these
faults and omissions, but national income remains a quite inadequate measure of
economic welfare or of human development.
Some of these shortcomings can be removed by adjustments in the accounting
methods. These concern those components of well-being that can be, in principle,
brought into relation with the measuring rod of money. A monetary value can be
attached to le isure t ime. Income distr ibut ion can be al lowed for by attaching
greater weights to the incomes and their growth of the bottom 20 percent or 30
percent or 40 percent of the population. Depletion of nonrenewable raw materials
can be evaluated, and a measure for sustainable income can be designed.
For other components of choice and welfare, monetary measurement is much more
difficult or may be impossible. The enjoyment we derive from an unspoiled wilder-
ness, the satisfaction from work, political engagement that results from participa-
tion, the sense of community, brotherhood, and sisterhood that grows out of social
activities, the freedom, peace, and sense of security that are common in a well-run
society, these cannot easi ly be reduced to dol lars and cents. Yet they form the
essence of human development.
The contributing tributaries to human development can be grouped under f ive
headings: (1) economic growth, (2) human resource development, (3) human rights
and participation, (4) peace and security, and (5) sustainability. The role of culture
is discussed under the heading of human rights and participation. Issues of equity
and in particular of gender equity run through all five tributaries. 
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We now l ive in a “risk society.” People are bombarded with assessments of the
risks of decisions (from what they eat to whether they should build nuclear power
stat ions). They have lost the old certa int ies about how the ir l ives will turn out:
no more jobs, or marriages, for life.
Human development is the end, the tributaries are the means; but they can also
acquire end characterist ics themselves. Environmental susta inabil ity, peace,
participat ion, human resources, and by some even economic growth are valued
in their own right. To the extent that they are ends, they all have to be included in
human development . The f ive tributaries can augment each other, for example,
when human resources contribute to higher growth, or respect for human rights
advances peace. There are also feedbacks from achievements in human develop-
ment to further improvements in human development. These may be indirect by
improving the five components (economic growth, human resource development,
human rights and participation, peace and security, and sustainability), or they
may be direct . The latter occur within and between famil ies when knowledge
is passed on and when better education of mothers has an impact on their children.
Several studies have shown that women’s education, control over cash income, and
access to power, in addition to being desirable in themselves, improve the health,
nutrit ion, and educat ion of children, reduce fert i l i ty, reduce infant mortal i ty,
reduce health hazard of adults arising from low birth weight, raise productivity,
reduce inequality, are beneficial for the environment, and increase the range and
effectiveness of public debates.
Gender issues are part icularly important for reproduct ive freedom: for people,
especially women, to be able to choose the size of their families. There is now a
wealth of evidence to show that given the opportunity to choose smaller families
without adverse economic and social consequences, smaller families are indeed
chosen. With human development—that is, with the expansion of education, especi-
al ly of girls and women—the reduct ion of infant mortal ity rates, and medical
faci l it ies (including the opportunity of birth control), fert i l ity rates have come
down sharply. It may seem paradoxical that reduced infant mortality rates, more
children surviving, should contribute to reduced populat ion growth. But there
is overwhelming evidence that parents try to over-insure themselves against the
deaths of their children (particularly sons) and that more surviving children reduce
the desired family size. Human development is the best way to reduce population
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growth, and reduced population growth advances human development. Human
development, in addition to longer l ife expectancy, better education, and securer
lives, makes it possible for people to opt for smaller families.
It is thought that some of these links lend themselves more easily to measurement
than others. The human resources of education can be captured under l iteracy
rates and school enrol lment rates, of heal th under l i fe expectancy and infant
mortal ity. It is for this reason that more attention has been pa id to these l inks
than to others, such as that between participation and human development, not so
readily brought into relation with a measuring rod. Some may have become victims
of the fallacy that what cannot be counted does not count or even exist. But it may
be questioned whether the quality of education or the attitudes that a good educa-
tion instills, such as punctual ity, discipline, teamwork , etc., are caught under the
conventional stat ist ical social indicators. The same goes for health measures.
Economic growth, based on increases in GNP, has, of course, been the archetypal
case of counting and has attracted the limelight of attention.
The Human Development Index
The most eye-catching and headline-making contribution of the Human Development
Reports has been the Human Development Index (HDI). It comprises (1) the loga-
rithm of GDP per head, calculated at the real purchasing power, not at exchange
rates, up to the international poverty line; (in Reports after the 1990 Report this
was modified in various ways); (2) literacy rates (and, since the 1991 Report, mean
years of school ing); and (3) l ife expectancy at birth. These disparate items are
brought to a common denominator by counting the distance between the best and
worst performers and thereby achieving a ranking of countries. Critics have said
that not only are the we ights of the three components arbitrary, but also what
is excluded, and what is included.
Partha Dasgupta has pointed out that the HDI misrepresents concerns about the
future, since it does not deduct capital depreciation; that it reflects only current
well-being and that it is an index only of human capital, leaving out natural capital.
If these omissions are allowed for, what appears as a good human development
performance turns out to be much worse.11
Another problem with the HDI is the implici t trade-off between l ife expectancy
and income. For a country with an income per head less than the world average
($5,711 per year at 1993 purchasing power par i ty, which is about the income
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per head of Costa Rica) an increase of annual GDP per head of $99 will exactly
compensate for one year less of l ife expectancy, so as to keep the HDI constant.12
If the people in one poor country have one year less of l i fe expectancy but
$100 higher GDP per head than in another country, this country will have a higher
HDI. The value attached to longevity rises sharply with income. For a country
with twice the average income (about the income per head of Malta), an extra year
of life is valued at $7,482 in income per head. At three times the average (about
the income in the United Kingdom), it is worth $31,631, about twice the country’s
income per head. At four times the average (about Switzerland’s income), its value
reaches $65,038, about three times actual income. The implication is that life is far
less valuable in poor countries than in rich ones. The value judgments underlying
these trade-offs have been rightly rejected. So “Human Development” and the Human
Development Index are not ultimate insights and other ideas will take their place.
We are all free to guess what these will be.
Another quest ion is, should a freedom (or human rights) index be integrated
with the Human Development Index? There are some arguments in favor, but
the balance of arguments is probably against. First, it might be said that “freedom
from” is so important (and, opportunity costs apart, costless) that no trade-off
should be possible between i ts loss and ga ins in some of the other indicators.13
Secondly, political conditions are much more volatile than education and health.
Once a mother knows the importance of education for her children, or of hygiene,
this knowledge is not lost even when the family’s income drops. So human
indicators tend to be fa irly stable. There is a ratchet effect that prevents rapid,
large downward moves. Pol i t ical indicat ions, on the other hand, can change
overnight with a coup. A third argument aga inst aggregat ing freedom with the
positive aspects of human development is that grading is more subjective and less
rel iable than measuring l ife expectancy or l iteracy. Using indicators for freedom
and human rights is open to the objection of Eurocentricity.
Finally, one of the most interesting questions is how freedom is related to human
development more narrowly interpreted, or how negat ive and posi t ive rights
or freedom are associated. This can be done only if they are recorded by separate
indexes, not components of the same.14 Thus, we might formulate a hypothesis
that freedom, though not a necessary condition of human development, narrowly
defined, is entirely consistent with it, even at quite low levels; and that human
deve lopment , once i t has reached a certa in stage, leads inevitably to the ca l l
for freedom by the people. Here is a message of hope.
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